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PREVAILING WAGE LEGISLATION AND THE 
CONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE 
David E. Bernstein† 
 
Research on how twentieth-century government regulation of economic activity 
contributed to the oppression of African Americans has traditionally focused on Jim 
Crow legislation in the American South.  More recently, scholars have documented 
the ways that  other types of government regulation, ranging from federal and state 
labor laws1 to federal housing and mortgage policies,2 have harmed African 
Americans.3  The contribution of federal, state, and local regulation to racial 
inequality received significant mainstream attention thanks to the publication of Ta-
Nehisi Coates’ much discussed-essay, The Case for Reparations.4  It is therefore a 
propitious time to examine the largely unknown discriminatory origins and effects of 
prevailing wage legislation. 
Since the early twentieth century, labor unions have lobbied federal and state 
governments to enact and enforce laws requiring government contractors to pay 
“prevailing wages” to employees on public works projects.  These laws, currently 
active at the federal level and in approximately thirty states,5 typically in practice 
require that contractors pay according to the local union wage scale.  The laws also 
require employers to adhere to union work rules.6  The combination of these rules 
 
†  University Professor, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University.  The author thanks 
Armand Thieblot for helpful comments. 
 1. See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS, LABOR 
REGULATIONS, AND THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL (2001); PAUL D. MORENO, 
BLACKS AND ORGANIZED LABOR:  A NEW HISTORY (2008); Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor 
Standards Act:  Racial Discrimination in the New Deal, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1335 (1987). 
 2. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:  SEGREGATION AND 
THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993); RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW:  A FORGOTTEN 
HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017); Florence Wagman Roisman, Intentional 
Racial Discrimination and Segregation by the Federal Government as a Principal Cause of Concentrated 
Poverty:  A Response to Schill and Wachter, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1351 (1995). 
 3. See generally IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE:  AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF 
RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2005); DESMOND KING, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL:  
BLACK AMERICANS AND THE US FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1995). 
 4. Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC (June 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631. 
 5. Dollar Threshold Amount for Contract Coverage Under State Prevailing Wage Laws, DEP’T OF LAB. 
WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, https://www.dol.gov/whd/state/dollar.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2017).  
 6. See ARMAND J. THIEBLOT, JR., PREVAILING WAGE LEGISLATION:  THE DAVIS-BACON ACT, STATE 
“LITTLE DAVIS-BACON” ACTS, AND THE SERVICE CONTRACT ACT (1986) [hereinafter THIEBLOT, PREVAILING 
WAGE LEGISLATION]. In some jurisdictions, the law is skewed to make the “prevailing wage” equivalent to a 
hypothetical, higher union wage, rather than to follow what union workers actually get from private contracts. 
See ARMAND THIEBLOT, THE CASE AGAINST THE DAVIS-BACON ACT:  54 REASONS FOR REPEAL (2013) 
[hereinafter THIEBLOT, THE CASE AGAINST THE DAVIS-BACON ACT] (contending that instead of reflecting local 
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makes it extremely difficult for nonunion contractors to compete for public works 
contracts.7 
Meanwhile, construction unions have been among the most persistently 
exclusionary institutions in American society.8  Not surprisingly, in many cases the 
history of prevailing wage legislation has been intertwined with the history of racial 
discrimination.  Economists and others argue that prevailing wage legislation 
continues to have discriminatory effects on minorities today.  Union advocates, not 
surprisingly, deny that prevailing wage laws have discriminatory effects.  More 
surprisingly, they deny that the granddaddy of modern prevailing wage legislation, 
the federal Davis-Bacon Act of 1931, had discriminatory intent.9 
Part I of this Article discusses the discriminatory history of the most significant 
of all prevailing wage laws, the Davis-Bacon Act.  As discussed below, Davis-Bacon 
was passed with the explicit intent of excluding African American workers from 
federal construction projects, and its discriminatory effects continued for decades. 
Part II of this Article discusses the controversy over whether prevailing wage 
legislation continues to have discriminatory effects.  The section begins with a 
discussion of the empirical literature on the effects of prevailing wage discrimination 
on minority employment.  The section next presents evidence that construction 
unions continue to discriminate against members of minority groups, albeit much 
more subtly than in the past.  The section concludes by recounting allegations that 




wages, prevailing wage laws inflate them); E.J. MCMAHON & KENT GARDNER, PREVAILING WASTE:  NEW 
YORK’S COSTLY PUBLIC WORKS PAY MANDATE (2017), 
https://www.empirecenter.org/publications/prevailing-waste. 
 7. “Davis-Bacon mandates inflated wage rates . . . and creates rigid job classifications and procedures 
which, though standard operating procedure for unions, are anathema to small non-unionized firms.” Removing 
Barriers to Opportunity:  A Constitutional Challenge to the Davis-Bacon Act, INST. FOR JUST., 
http://ij.org/case/brazier-construction-co-inc-v-reich/#backgrounder (last visited Apr. 6, 2018). 
 8. See, e.g., Charles S. Johnson, Negro Workers and the Unions, SURVEY (Apr. 15, 1928), at 113–14. The 
article reveals that as of 1927, “Practically none” of the members of the electricians’ union were African 
American, the sheet metal workers’ union had no African Americans among its 25,000 members, the plasterers’ 
unions had only 100 African American members among its 30,000 members, despite the presence of 6,000 
African Americans in the trade, the plumbers and steam fitters had “a long history” of successfully maneuvering 
to avoid admitting African American members, and the carpenters had 340,000 members, among whom only 
592 were African American. 
 9. See, e.g., PETER PHILIPS, THOUGHTLESS THINK TANKS:  FACTOID SCHOLARSHIP AND SOUND BITE 
THINKING ABOUT THE HISTORY AND INTENT OF PREVAILING WAGE LAWS 7 (2001). It should be noted that 
Philips writes, in reference to me, “An extensive literature search does not show that Bernstein ever wrote on 
this topic before or after” a briefing paper I wrote about the Davis-Bacon Act published by the Cato Institute in 
January 1993.  In fact, between then and when Philips’ paper was published, I wrote the following papers that 
discussed prevailing wage legislation in detail:  The Shameful, Wasteful History of New York’s Prevailing Wage 
Law, 7 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 1 (1997); The Davis-Bacon Act:  Vestige of Jim Crow, 13 NAT’L BLACK 
L.J. 276 (1994); EMPIRE FOUND. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, IT’S TIME TO REFORM NEW YORK’S PREVAILING 
WAGE LAW, (1993); and Roots of the ‘Underclass’:  The Decline of Laissez-faire Jurisprudence and the Rise 
of Racist Labor Legislation, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 85 (1993). So much for Philips’ “extensive literature search.”  
In fairness, Philips does acknowledge that state public works legislation, including prevailing wage laws, was 
used to exclude Chinse workers in the West, African American workers in Louisiana, and foreign workers in 
New York. 
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I.  THE DAVIS-BACON ACT OF 1931 
The Davis-Bacon Act10 is a federal prevailing wage law that applies to any 
construction project that receives federal funding.  Excluding competitors, especially 
nonwhite and immigrant competitors, from public works projects was an early goal 
of construction unions.  A Louisiana statute limited employment on public works to 
those who had paid their poll tax.11  Early Oregon and California statutes banned the 
use of Chinese laborers on public works projects,12 and a New York statute banned 
the use of aliens generally.13  Courts invalidated each of the laws as violations of 
liberty of contract and/or equal protection guarantees.14 
By the mid-1920s, New York was one of several states to require contractors on 
public-works projects to pay their employees the “prevailing wage.”  The prevailing 
wage was generally set at least as high as union wages to prevent union workers from 
being undercut by their competitors, including African Americans excluded from the 
unions.  The law, however, only applied to state, not federal, contractors. 
In 1927, Algernon Blair, a contractor from Alabama, received a federal contract 
to build a Veteran’s Bureau hospital in Long Island, New York.  The contractor 
employed primarily itinerant African American workers from the South.  
Representative Robert Bacon of Long Island complained on the floor of the House 
of Representative that these workers “were paid a very low wage . . . . that meant that 
the labor conditions in that part of New York State where this hospital was to be built 
were entirely upset.”15  Congressman William Upshaw of Georgia, apparently aware 
that the workers in question were African Americans, responded, “You will not think 
that a southern man is more than human if he smiles over the fact of your reaction to 
that real problem you are confronted with in any community with a superabundance 
or large aggregation of negro labor.”16  Bacon responded that “the same thing would 
be true if you should bring in a lot of Mexican laborers or if you brought in any 
nonunion laborers from any other State.”17 
In 1928, the House held hearings on Bacon’s “Bill to Require Contractors and 
Subcontractors Engaged on Public Works of the United States to Give Certain 
 
 10. Davis-Bacon Act, Pub. L. No. 71-798, ch. 411, 46 Stat. 1494 (1931), codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. 
§§ 3141–3148 (2012). 
 11. See Employment of Labor on Federal Construction Work:  Hearings on H.R. 7995 and H.R.9232 
Before the H. Comm. on Labor, 71st Cong. 15 (1930). 
 12. Ex Parte Kuback, 85 Cal. 274 (1890); Baker v. Portland, 2 F. Cas. 472 (C.C. D. Ore. 1879). The Los 
Angeles City Council also passed a similarly discriminatory public works statute in the late 19th Century. 
GRACE H. STIMSON, RISE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN LOS ANGELES 100 (1955). 
 13. N.Y. LAWS OF 1870, ch. 385, amended by N.Y. LAWS OF 1894, ch. 622. 
 14. Kuback, 85 Cal. 274; Baker, 2 F. Cas. 472; People v. Warren, 34 N.Y.S. 942 (Sup. Ct. 1895). 
 15. Hours of Labor and Wages on Public Works:  Hearing on H.R. 17069 Before the H. Comm. on Labor, 
69th Cong. 2 (1927). 
 16. Id. at 3. 
 17. Id. at 4. 
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Preferences in the Employment of Labor.”18  Secretary of Labor James J. Davis, who 
later became the Senate co-sponsor of the Davis-Bacon Act, sent the committee a 
letter supporting the bill.  He recounted that a contractor from the South brought an 
“entire outfit of negro laborers from the South” into Bacon's district, treated them 
badly, and “employed no local labor whatsoever.”19  William J. Spencer, Secretary 
of the Building Trades Department of the American Federation of Labor told the 
committee: 
There are complaints from all hospitals of the Veteran's Bureau against the 
condition of employment on these jobs.  That is true whether the job is in 
the State of Washington, Oregon, Oklahoma, or Florida.  The same 
complaints come in.  They are due to the fact that a contractor from 
Alabama may go to North Port and take a crew of negro workers and house 
them on the site of construction within a stockade and feed them and keep 
his organization intact thereby and work that job contrary to the existing 
practices in the city of New York.20 
At hearings in March 1930 on two new bills to regulate labor on federal 
construction projects, Representative William Henry Sproul complained that at St. 
Elizabeth's Hospital the contractor paid bricklayers less than the local prevailing 
wage.21  Representative John J. Cochran later explained that southern contractors 
were “employing low-paid colored mechanics” at St. Elizabeth’s.22  When the Senate 
held hearings in 1931 on the bill that was destined to become the Davis-Bacon Act, 
American Federation of Labor president William Green testified that “[c]olored labor 
is being brought in to demoralize wage rates” on federally-funded construction work 
in Kingsport, Tennessee.23  T.A. Lane, of the Bricklayers' Union, told the Senators 
that the Algernon Blair company was getting federal contracts and using imported 
“cheap labor.”24  In the House, Congressman Miles Allgood of Alabama remarked 
that Algernon Blair, a home state contractor, “has cheap colored labor that he 
transports, and he puts them in cabins, and it is labor of that sort that is in competition 
with white labor throughout the country.”25 
 
 18. See Preferences in the Employment of Labor on Federal Construction Works:  Hearings on H.R. 11141 
Before the H. Comm. on Labor, 70th Cong. (1928). The bill would have required federal contractors to give 
preference to residents of the state where the work is performed who are veterans, non-veteran residents, 
American citizens, and aliens, in that order. 
 19. Id. at 5. 
 20. Id. at 17. 
 21. Employment of Labor on Federal Construction Work:  Hearings on H.R. 7995 and H.R. 9232 Before 
the H. Comm. on Labor, 71st Cong. 18 (1930). 
 22. Id. at 26–27. 
 23. Wages of Laborers and Mechanics on Public Buildings:  Hearings on S. 5904 Before the S. Comm. on 
Manufactures, 71st Cong. 10 (1931). 
 24. Id. at 15–16. 
 25. Id. at 513. 
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The Davis-Bacon Act became law soon thereafter.26  A year later, a union official 
complained to the House Committee on Labor that non-enforcement of the Act 
allowed a contractor to hire a mixed crew of white and African American workers: 
Mr. Summers, a steel erector, violated the law by paying only $12 a week 
and board to ironworkers, and he rented a shack in which he had white 
men and negroes sleep together.  In that instance I complained to District 
of Columbia officials about the violation of the wage law, without result.27 
Davis-Bacon was not solely motivated by racial animus.  The construction 
unions wanted to reserve federal contracting jobs for their members, regardless of the 
race of their nonunion competitors.  Nevertheless, given the racially exclusionary 
policies of labor unions, and the fact that several Congressmen and committee 
witnesses specifically complained about the use of black workers by Algernon Blair 
and other federal contractors, racial animus was clearly a significant factor 
motivating the passage of Davis-Bacon. 
As intended, the Act eventually reserved jobs on federal construction contracts 
primarily for white union men.  The discriminatory effects of Davis-Bacon were built 
into the structure of the law, and were destined to persist so long as discriminatory 
union policies persisted.  For example, many construction jobs for federal projects 
were filled via union “hiring halls,” from which black workers were excluded.28  
Davis-Bacon substantially contributed to a decline in African American participation 
in the construction industry.29 
Because of construction unions’ refusal to significantly modify longstanding 
policies restricting or even prohibiting membership by non-whites, even the 1964 
Civil Rights Act did not substantially ameliorate Davis-Bacon’s discriminatory 
effects.30  The Nixon Administration’s Department of Labor concluded that repealing 
Davis-Bacon would be an efficient means of increasing minority employment on 
 
 26. In 1964, the definition of “wages” was expanded to include benefits including health insurance, 
retirement, disability, unemployment, vacation pay, and apprenticeship program costs. Pub. L. No. 88-349, 78 
Stat. 238 (1964). 
 27. Regulation of Wages Paid to Employees by Contractors Awarded Government Building Contracts:  
Hearings on S. 3847 and H.R. 11865 Before the H. Comm. on Labor, 72nd Cong. 190 (1932) (statement of Dan 
M. Gayton, International Association of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers). In 1935, Congress 
responded to complaints about the difficulties of enforcing the Act’s prevailing wage requirement by 
establishing a lower coverage threshold, requiring that the Department of Labor pre-determine the prevailing 
wage rate, and extending the law’s coverage. WILLIAM G. WHITTAKER, CONG. RES. SERV. 94-908, DAVIS-
BACON:  THE ACT AND THE LITERATURE (2007). 
 28. Herman D. Bloch, Craft Unions and the Negro in Historical Perspective, 43 J. NEGRO HIST. 10, 24 
(1958). 
 29. Roger Waldinger & Thomas Bailey, The Continuing Significance of Race:  Racial Conflict and Racial 
Discrimination in Construction, 19 POL. & SOC’Y 291, 301 (1991), available at 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/003232929101900302. 
 30. A 1968 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission study found that “the pattern of minority 
employment is better for each minority group among employers who do not contract work for the government 
[and are therefore not subject to Davis-Bacon] than it is among prime contractors who have agreed to 
nondiscrimination clauses in their contracts with the federal government” who were subject to Davis-Bacon. 
HERBERT HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 389 n* (1977). 
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public works projects.31  To avoid unduly offending the union voters Nixon was 
wooing, however, the Department instead decided to launch affirmative-action “city 
plans” to encourage the use of skilled minority workers in federal construction 
projects.32  These plans, however, were a mixed success at best.  A series of studies 
conducted in the 1970s and ‘80s concluded that Davis-Bacon continued to have 
discriminatory effects on African-American workers.33 
While debate over Davis-Bacon and its potential lingering discriminatory effects 
continues, occasionally Davis-Bacon advocates will support the Act for explicitly 
discriminatory reasons.  In the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, President George 
W. Bush used his statutory authority to suspend the Act in the area affected by the 
hurricane to facilitate cleanup and reconstruction.34  Pro-union critics expressed 
outraged, with many explicitly arguing that enforcing the Act was necessary to 
prevent itinerant immigrant workers from obtaining jobs on Katrina-related 
projects.35  Under political pressure, Bush eventually repealed the suspension.36 
II.  DOES STATE PREVAILING WAGE LEGISLATION HARM MINORITIES? 
As Davis-Bacon wreaked havoc on minority employment in the construction 
industry, states passed and enforced their own prevailing wage laws, generally 
modeled on Davis-Bacon.  These laws have also been the subject of allegations that 
 
 31. PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS & LAWRENCE M. STRATTON, THE NEW COLOR LINE 102 (1995). 
 32. Herbert Hill, The AFL-CIO and the Black Worker:  Twenty-Five Years After the Merger, 10 J. 
INTERGROUP RELATIONS 5, 20 (1982). 
 33. THIEBLOT, PREVAILING WAGE LEGISLATION, supra note 6, at 157; THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF 
THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS HRD-79-18:  THE DAVIS-BACON ACT SHOULD BE REPEALED 
32 (1979); JOHN P. GOULD & GEORGE BITTLINGMAYER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE DAVIS-BACON ACT:  AN 
ANALYSIS OF PREVAILING WAGE LAWS 62 (1980); William A. Keyes, The Minimum Wage and the Davis-
Bacon Act:  Employment Effects on Minorities and Youth, 3 J. LAB. RES. 398, 407 (1982). See generally Robert 
A. Levy, An Equal Protection Analysis of the Davis-Bacon Act, 1995 DET. C. L. REV. 973 (1995). 
 34. Proclamation 7924, 70 Fed. Reg. 54,227 (Sept. 8, 2005); see also JOHN R. LUCKEY & JON O. 
SHIMABUKURO, CONG. RES. SERV. RS22265, PREVAILING WAGE REQUIREMENTS AND THE EMERGENCY 
SUSPENSION OF THE DAVIS-BACON ACT (2005). 
 35. See Roberto Lovato, Using Illegal Labor to Clean Up After Katrina:  Gulf Coast Slaves, SPIEGEL 
ONLINE (Nov. 15, 2005), http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,385044,00.html. Senator Mary Landrieu 
wrote to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, “While my state experiences unemployment 
rates not seen since the Great Depression, it is unconscionable that illegal workers would be brought into 
Louisiana, aggravating our employment crisis and depressing earnings for our workers.” JUDITH BROWNE-
DIANIS ET AL., AND INJUSTICE FOR ALL:  WORKERS’ LIVES IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF NEW ORLEANS 12 
(2006). The Democratic Senate Policy Committee complained, “[I]nstead of providing jobs to displaced local 
workers, contractors have hired out-of-state migrant workers willing to accept minimal compensation.” 
DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMM., BUSH ADMIN., CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS MISMANAGE HURRICANE 
RECOVERY (2005). Congressman Steven LaTourette argued, “There are thousands of skilled Gulf Coast 
workers who should be working to rebuild their communities, and . . . companies are passing them by and hiring 
cheap unskilled illegal workers to beef up their bottom line.” Press Release, October 26, 2005, from the website 
of Representative Steven LaTourette (Oct. 26, 2005). For the claim that inhibiting immigrants from obtaining 
jobs on Katrina projects prevented their “exploitation,” see Haley E. Olam & Erin S. Stamper, Note, The 
Suspension of the Davis Bacon Act and the Exploitation of Migrant Workers in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina, 
24 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 145, 146 (2006); see also D. Aaron Lacy, The Aftermath of Katrina:  Race, 
Undocumented Workers, and the Color of Money, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 497 (2007) (discussing 
competition between African Americans and undocumented immigrants for Katrina-related jobs). 
 36. Griff Witte, Prevailing Wages to be Paid Again on Gulf Coast, WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2005), at A10. 
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they have discriminatory effects on African American and other minority workers.  
This section begins with a discussion of the controversy in the economics literature 
over whether empirical evidence demonstrates that state prevailing wage legislation 
reduces minority employment.  Next, it discusses evidence of continuing 
discrimination by construction labor unions.  This section concludes with a brief 
discussion of allegations that prevailing wage legislation harms minority contractors, 
which in turn limits the utilization of minority workers. 
A. Economic Literature on the Effects of Prevailing Wage Legislation on 
Minorities 
At one time, state prevailing wage laws were nearly ubiquitous, but many states 
repealed their laws starting in the 1980s.  By January 2017, thirty states still had 
prevailing wage legislation.37  The repeals provided researchers with a data set they 
could use to explore the impact of prevailing wage legislation on minority 
employment. 
The results of this research have been mixed.  Some articles conclude that such 
legislation harms minority workers, while others (almost all by researchers associated 
with the University of Utah) conclude that such legislation is essentially neutral.  No 
academic articles appear to argue that prevailing wage legislation disproportionately 
benefits minority workers. 
Daniel Kessler and Lawrence Katz analyzed Current Population Survey data and 
Census data and found that the relative wages of construction workers decline slightly 
after the repeal of a state prevailing wage law.38  However, “the small overall impact 
of law repeal masks substantial differences in outcomes for different groups of 
construction employees.  Repeal is associated with a sizable reduction in the union 
wage premium and an appreciable narrowing of the black/non-black wage 
differential for construction workers.”39  The authors note that repealing prevailing 
wage legislation also raises the wages African American construction workers get 
relative to other African American workers, which implies that repeal of prevailing 
wage laws may benefit African American construction workers.40 
Economist Armand Thieblot, a long-time critic of prevailing wage legislation, 
found based on 1990 census data “a strongly inverse correlation . . . between black 
employment and strength of prevailing wage law.”41  Thieblot found that while 
African American employment in construction is generally below black employment 
in other sectors, African American employment in construction is closer to average 
in states with no prevailing wage law, lower in states that have prevailing wage laws, 
and progressively lower in states with progressively stronger prevailing wage laws.42  
 
 37. DEP’T OF LAB., supra note 5.  
 38. Daniel P. Kessler & Lawrence F. Katz, Prevailing Wage Laws and Construction Labor Markets, 54 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 259 (2001). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 273. 
 41. A. J. Thieblot, Prevailing Wage Laws and Black Employment in the Construction Industry, 20 J. LAB. 
RES. 155 (1999). 
 42. Id. 
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In other words, the stronger a state prevailing wage law, the weaker African 
American employment in the construction industry. 
Economists Hamid Azari-rad and Peter Philips (an outspoken supporter of 
prevailing wage laws) of the University of Utah responded to Thieblot’s article by 
arguing that the 1970 Census data shows that African American construction workers 
happened to be relatively abundant in states that had prevailing wage laws at the time, 
and would later repeal their prevailing wage laws.43  According to Azari-rad and 
Philips, if one only looked at the 1990 data, one might think that the relative 
abundance of African American construction workers in certain states was due to the 
absence of a prevailing wage law.44  In fact, however, that abundance also existed 
when prevailing wage legislation was in effect.45  This suggests that studies like 
Thieblot’s that simply compare prevailing wage states to non-prevailing wage states, 
without considering whether these states have other relevant labor market 
differences, are not good evidence of either the strength, or even existence, of a causal 
relationship between prevailing wage legislation and black unemployment.46 
Thieblot asserted that Azari-rad and Philips reached their conclusion by cherry-
picking data, accomplished by excluding eight southern states from their data.47  
Thieblot pointed out that those eight states contain 97.6% of the African Americans 
who work in construction in states without prevailing wage laws, and almost half of 
all African American construction workers.48  Thieblot acknowledged that some non-
prevailing wage law states had relatively high African American employment in 
construction even when those states had prevailing wage laws.49  He argued, 
however, that this is just a proxy for the level of labor unionism.  States with relatively 
high levels of African American employment in construction also tended to have 
weaker unions, which is why it was easier to repeal prevailing wage legislation in 
those states.50  But the weakness of unions also meant that when the prevailing wage 
laws were repealed, African Americans were in an especially good position to 
benefit.51 
Another University of Utah economist concluded in 2003 that there are 
significant differences in apprenticeship rates in the construction industry for 
minorities among states that have strong prevailing wage laws, weak prevailing wage 
laws, and no such laws, but there is no consistent pattern.  Hence, the data does not 
 
 43. Hamid Azari-rad & Peter Philips, Race and Prevailing Wage Laws in the Construction Industry:  
Comment on Thieblot, 24 J. LAB. RES. 161 (2003). 
 44. Id. at 162. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. A.J. Thieblot, Race and Prevailing Wage Laws in the Construction Industry:  Reply to Azari-Rad and 
Philips, 24 J. LAB. RES. 169, 171 (2003). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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lend itself to any obvious interpretation.52  The author concludes that there is no 
evidence that prevailing wage laws stifle minority participation in apprenticeships.53 
Two years later, economist Dale Belman published a book chapter 
acknowledging that there is a negative correlation between state prevailing wage 
legislation and minority employment.54  However, Belman claims that this 
correlation disappears if one controls for the racial composition of the states’ non-
construction labor force.55  More generally, he claims that studies suggesting the 
prevailing wage laws limit minority employment are derived from naive models that 
do not adequately account for relevant factors beyond those laws.56 
Also in 2005, Mark Price, a student of Professor Philips, completed a Ph.D. 
dissertation on state prevailing wage laws.57  Based on data collected in the Current 
Population Survey between 1977 and 2002, Price found no evidence that African 
American construction workers received an increase in hourly wages or benefits 
coverage as a result of the repeal of prevailing wage laws.58  However, such repeals 
did lead to a decline in unionization among less-skilled construction workers.59  
Because African American construction workers are disproportionately less-skilled, 
repeal of prevailing wage laws led to a disproportionate decline in African American 
membership in construction unions.60 
An analysis undertaken by economist Elizabeth Roistacher and others on behalf 
of the Citizens Housing & Planning Council in New York City found that extending 
a prevailing wage mandate to low-income housing projects would have a strongly 
adverse impact on the largely minority labor force that had been engaged in that 
work.61  The researchers found that there is continuing—albeit subtle—
discrimination in favor of white construction workers in New York unions that 
benefit from prevailing wage legislation, and that the imposition of prevailing wage 
requirements is a large hindrance to minority-owned firms.62  “Few such firms,” they 
wrote, “have the back-office capacity to comply with the complex reporting and 
oversight requirements of prevailing wages.”63  Consequently, they concluded, if 
 
 52. Cihan Bilginsoy, Wage Regulation and Training: The Impact of State Prevailing Wage Laws on 
Apprenticeship (Univ. of Utah Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 2003-08, 2003), 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/23696701_Wage_Regulation_and_Training_The_Impact_of_State_
Prevailing_Wage_Laws_on_Apprenticeship. 
 53. Id. at 20. 
 54. Dale Belman, Prevailing Wage Laws, Unions, and Minority Employment in Construction:  A Historical 
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New York were to mandate the payment of prevailing wages on low-income housing 
projects, many African American and Latino workers who currently are employed on 
such projects would lose their jobs.64 
A recent article on prevailing wage legislation and minority employment 
expressed skepticism about the validity and persuasiveness of the empirical research 
of the effect of prevailing wage legislation on minority employment, whichever side 
of the debate it comes from.65  The author argued that the “use of statistics in 
evaluating the construction industry is difficult, particularly if the analysis does not 
distinguish between the individual trade disciplines.”66  He suggested that “[a]n 
accurate statistical analysis regarding whether minorities and women have fair access 
to construction opportunities must be done on a trade-by-trade basis in each county 
or market being studied during the same time frame,” and that, “[a] good way to 
survey participation of minorities on Davis-Bacon-funded projects is to compare 
demographic information derived from payroll reports with area demographic 
data.”67  However, economists studying the issue have yet to undertake such a 
study.68 
Most recently, a University of Montana master’s thesis, comparing employment 
data from states that repealed their prevailing wage legislation with data from states 
that did not, concluded that repealing a prevailing wage law is associated with an 
across-the-board increase in employment.69  One subgroup of workers, Hispanics, 
benefits significantly more than average from repeal.70 
B. Do Labor Unions Still Discriminate Against Minority Workers? 
Defenders of prevailing wage legislation might argue that whatever 
discriminatory effects prevailing wage laws may have had in the past were a product 
of historical patterns of discrimination in labor unions that no longer exist.  Unions 
not only do not exclude members of minority groups any more, under public and 
government pressure they often undertake affirmative action policies seeking to place 
members of minority groups in apprenticeships and ultimately in full-time union jobs. 
Past research, however, suggests that affirmative action policies in cities like 
New York ultimately did little to provide long-term union employment for minority 
construction workers.  The problems ranged from union intransigence regarding 
discrimination to unions’ declining share of the construction labor market, which left 
little room for new workers in a system dominated by hiring preferences based on 
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seniority.71  Ironically, the availability of a pool of nonunion minority workers to 
contractors in the 1970s and beyond due to union discrimination strengthened the 
hand of nonunion employers and helped cause the significant decline in the 
percentage of construction workers represented by unions.72 
Surprisingly, an extensive literature search found no broad academic study of 
discrimination in construction unions since Waldinger and Bailey’s 1991 study of the 
persistence of racial discrimination in New York unions.73  There are occasional 
anecdotal reports of discrimination in the academic literature.  For example, the 
authors of a chapter of a book about race and migration in New York reported that 
“many Jamaican men report strong barriers to joining white-dominated skilled trades 
and construction unions and racial discrimination in finding jobs as contractors.”74 
Beyond the academic literature, one finds occasional anecdotal reports of 
persistent discrimination in labor unions, especially in the New York City area.75  For 
example, one activist claims that while New York construction unions have become 
somewhat more racially integrated in the last twenty years, the Carpenters and 
Laborer unions, which represent relatively low-paid workers, have the bulk of 
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minority workers, while unions of more skilled workers are still overwhelmingly 
white.76  When asked to point to progress in ending discrimination, union leaders and 
politicians often point to apprenticeship programs run by the unions and geared 
toward minority workers.77  However, few of these apprentices ever get steady union 
work.78  Meanwhile, “the workforce on the non union side is overwhelmingly 
minority . . . . mostly Latino, with sizable numbers of Black, Chinese, and South 
Asian workers as well.”79 
Litigation against discriminatory labor unions has also persisted.  Charles Brown, 
an African American certified welder, received a settlement in 1991 against the 
Ironworkers as the result of a settlement of a race discrimination lawsuit filed by the 
EEOC against Ironworkers Local 580.  The court found that the union violated a 1978 
court order banning discriminatory job referrals.  The court also found the union 
guilty of retaliatory harassment.80 
Brown received a $40,000 damages award, but his ordeal was not yet over.  
Despite seeking work at the union’s hiring hall three or four times a week, he received 
only about two months’ worth of work referrals over nine years, while enduring 
threats and blacklistings.81  He therefore sued the union for violating the consent 
decree.82 
Angel Vasquez, another plaintiff in the lawsuit who is of Hispanic descent, also 
reported that he almost never got chosen for work when he went to the hiring hall.  
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Despite regularly showing up at the hiring hall, most of his work was from referrals 
from friends, not the union.  Brown and Vasquez’s attorney, Ramon Jiminez, filed a 
motion with the court overseeing the earlier Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) settlement arguing that his clients should be recognized as 
third-party beneficiaries of the settlement agreement, and asking for an order finding 
Local 580 in civil contempt for violating the court’s orders that accompanied the 
settlement.  The plaintiffs at the same time filed a new Title VII lawsuit for race 
discrimination.  The EEOC meanwhile commenced an investigation into Local 80’s 
compliance with the applicable court orders.83 
For unclear procedural reasons, the action eventually shifted to an EEOC claim 
that local 580 violated the 1991 consent decree by discriminating against minority 
workers in Westchester County and New York City with regard to job referrals and 
by failing to adhere to the apprentice-to-journeyperson ratio required by the consent 
decree.  The parties settled the latter claim when Local 580 agreed to a settlement 
worth $4.5 million, which would, among other things, increase the Local’s budget 
for its Apprentice Training Facility.84 
With regard to referrals, the EEOC claimed that there was a substantial disparity 
between the opportunities given to minority workers and white workers.  In 2007, the 
EEOC reached a settlement with Local 580 in which the latter agreed to pay the 
EEOC $800,000 and provide “substantial remedial relief” to settle the case.85  The 
case was not fully settled, however.  The EEOC refused to drop its lawsuit until the 
local showed substantial progress for several years in abandoning discriminatory 
practices.86 
Meanwhile, each of the individual plaintiffs represented by Jiminez was offered 
a settlement in 2003 based on formula agreed upon by the union and the EEOC.  Each 
of the plaintiffs accepted the settlement except for Brown, who found the offer of 
$42,000 inadequate and instead chose to continue the litigation without an attorney, 
requesting a contempt award of over six million dollars.87  After much additional 
procedural wrangling, in 2011 a magistrate judge recommended that the court award 
Brown the original $42,000.88  It was so ordered by Judge Lewis Kaplan, and the 
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litigation ended.89  However, EEOC monitoring of Local 580's compliance with its 
obligations under its various settlement agreements continues to this day.90 
The Sheet Metal Workers have also continued to find themselves defending the 
union in court from claims of discrimination.  The EEOC first sued Local 28 for race 
discrimination in the early 1970s and has been in on-and-off litigation with the union 
over its violations of the resulting court orders ever since, resulting in a series of 
contempt orders against the local.91  In 2004, the Hispanic Society brought an action 
as plaintiff-intervenors on behalf of itself and a certified class of all black and 
Hispanic persons who are or were at any time since 1984 members, either as 
journeypersons or apprentices, of Local 28 and who are or were “underemployed” as 
compared to their white counterparts.92 
The plaintiffs claimed that statistical analysis of the 1991 to 2003 period showed 
that statistically significant work hours disparities between white and nonwhite 
workers persisted, alleged that the disparities were attributable to race, and alleged 
that Local 28 failed to make diligent efforts to remedy these disparities.93  The court 
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, concluding: 
Local 28’s lack of engagement in rectifying discriminatory practices has 
had a severe detrimental effect not only on its nonwhite union members 
but also on the union as a whole.  Local 28 has endured years of litigation, 
with all the attendant costs both to its financial resources and its reputation.  
For this, the union has only itself to blame.  Perpetual resistance and foot-
dragging on the union's part will not cow the court from using the full 
range of powers at its disposal to ensure that Local 28 fulfills its court-
ordered responsibilities.  Sadly, the union continues to evade its 
obligations and the court has no choice but to hold Local 28 in civil 
contempt, once again.94 
In January 2008, a federal judge approved a $6.2 million settlement.95  “This 
lawsuit has lasted 37 years because for a very long time the union’s old guard resisted 
change and would not bring itself into compliance with the court order,” remarked 
Jyotin Hamid, a partner with Debevoise & Plimpton, which represented the black and 
Hispanic workers in the case.96  The EEOC continues to monitor Local 28 for 
compliance with the settlement, and the union was the defendant in a lawsuit by a 
contractor for failing to meet its obligations under the apprenticeship provisions of 
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the settlement as recently as 2012.97  A special master continues to monitor the 
compliance of several other union locals with various anti-discrimination orders and 
settlements extending back decades.98 
Lawrence Mishel of the pro-union Economic Policy Institute contends that 
despite reports of persistent discrimination, African Americans are a higher 
percentage of unionized construction workers in New York City than of non-union 
workers.99  Mishel, however, simply presents his conclusions, and there is no easy 
way to check whether his analysis is consistent with the underlying data. 
Nor is there any way to tell what extent the data reflects actual improved 
conditions for black workers on the ground.100  For example, some African 
Americans have reported that they are members of a building trades union, but rarely 
get work through the union.101  Finally, as Mishel acknowledges, Hispanics and other 
minorities (primarily Asian Americans) are vastly better represented in the nonunion 
sector of New York’s construction industry than in the union sector.  Over 75% of 
nonunion construction workers are members of minority groups, compared to 55% 
of unionized construction workers.102 
C. Prevailing Wage Law’s Effect on Minority Contractors 
Regardless of whether prevailing wage legislation harms minority workers, 
minority contractors allege that such legislation has discriminatory effects on them.  
As noted previously, Roistacher and colleagues found that minority contractors find 
it extremely difficult to compete for government contracts because of massive 
paperwork and other expensive requirements.103 
Harry Alford, president and CEO of the National Black Chamber of Commerce, 
has stated that approximately 98% of construction companies owned by African 
Americans and Hispanics are nonunion and are frozen out by project labor 
agreements that implicitly require union labor.104  The same dynamic would apply to 
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prevailing wage legislation that favors union contractors.105  Alford also quoted 
Anthony Robinson, President of the Minority Business Enterprise Legal Defense and 
Education Fund, who testified in the House of Representatives that “the construction 
trade labor unions have been, and remain, a serious obstacle to the participation of 
minority contractors and workers in the construction industry.”106 
CONCLUSION 
Historically, prevailing wage legislation has been a disaster for minority 
construction workers.  Such laws bias the labor market in favor of labor unions, and 
construction labor unions have been among the most vociferously exclusionary 
entities in the United States.  Persistent discrimination lawsuits, combined with 
anecdotal reports of discrimination, suggest that significant discrimination continues 
to exist in construction unions.  Given that prevailing wage laws tend to operate to 
exclude nonunion labor in favor of union labor, this works to the detriment of 
minority workers who are subject to union discrimination. 
Regardless of intentional discrimination, prevailing wage laws give an advantage 
to union contractors and labor unions, while people of color are much better 
represented in the nonunion sector of the industry.  The seniority system favors older 
white male workers who received their jobs when discrimination was still rampant 
over younger, more ethnically diverse construction workers. 
The economic literature on the effects of prevailing wage laws is divided 
between those who conclude that prevailing wage laws exclude minority workers and 
those who believe that such exclusion is unproven.  There do not appear to be any 
articles addressing in any detail the effect of prevailing wage laws on minority-owned 
contracting companies, but given that they are overwhelmingly nonunion, such laws 
almost certainly serve to disproportionately exclude such companies.  If so, this 
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